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ABSTRACT
Rankings are ubiquitous in the online world today. As we have
transitioned from finding books in libraries to ranking products,
jobs, job applicants, opinions and potential romantic partners, there
is a substantial precedent that ranking systems have a responsibility
not only to their users but also to the items being ranked. To address
these often conflicting responsibilities, we propose a conceptual and
computational framework that allows the formulation of fairness
constraints on rankings in terms of exposure allocation. As part of
this framework, we develop efficient algorithms for finding rankings
that maximize the utility for the user while provably satisfying a
specifiable notion of fairness. Since fairness goals can be application
specific, we show how a broad range of fairness constraints can be
implemented using our framework, including forms of demographic
parity, disparate treatment, and disparate impact constraints. We
illustrate the effect of these constraints by providing empirical
results on two ranking problems.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Rankings have become one of the dominant forms with which
online systems present results to the user. Far surpassing their con-
ception in library science as a tool for finding books in a library, the
prevalence of rankings now ranges from search engines and online
stores, to recommender systems and news feeds. Consequently, it
is no longer just books that are being ranked, but there is hardly
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anything that is not being ranked today – products, jobs, job seek-
ers, opinions, potential romantic partners. Nevertheless, one of the
guiding technical principles behind the optimization of ranking sys-
tems still dates back to four decades ago – namely the Probability
Ranking Principle (PRP) [28]. It states that the ideal ranking should
order items in the decreasing order of their probability of relevance,
since this is the ranking that maximizes utility of the retrieval sys-
tem to the user for a broad range of common utility measures in
Information Retrieval. But is this uncompromising focus on utility
to the users still appropriate when we are not ranking books in a
library, but people, products and opinions?
There are now substantial arguments and precedent that many
of the ranking systems in use today have responsibility not only to
their users, but also to the items that are being ranked. In particular,
the scarce resource that ranking systems allocate is the exposure
of items to users, and exposure is largely determined by position in
the ranking – and so is a job applicant’s chances to be interviewed
by an employer, an AirBnB host’s ability to rent out their property,
or a writer to be read. This exposes companies operating with
sensitive data to legal and reputation risks, and disagreements
about a fair allocation of exposure have already led to high-profile
legal challenges such as the European Union antitrust violation fine
on Google [30], and it has sparked a policy debate about search
neutrality [14]. It is unlikely that there will be a universal definition
of fairness that is appropriate across all applications, but we give
three concrete examples where a ranking system may be perceived
as unfair or biased in its treatment of the items that are being
ranked, and where the ranking system may want to impose fairness
constraints that guarantee some notion of fairness.
The main contribution of this paper is a conceptual and compu-
tational framework for formulating fairness constraints on rank-
ings, and the associated efficient algorithms for computing utility-
maximizing rankings subject to such fairness constraints. This
framework provides a flexible way for balancing fairness to the
items being ranked with the utility the rankings provide to the
users. In this way, we are not limited to a single definition of fair-
ness, since different application scenarios probably require different
trade-offs between the rights of the items and what can be consid-
ered an acceptable loss in utility to the user. We show that a broad
range of fairness constraints can be implemented in our framework,
using its expressive power to link exposure, relevance, and impact.
In particular, we show how to implement forms of demographic
parity, disparate treatment, and disparate impact constraints. The
ranking algorithm we develop provides provable guarantees for
optimizing expected utility while obeying the specified notion of
fairness in expectation.
To motivate the need and range of situations where one may
want to trade-off utility for some notion of fairness, we start with
presenting the following three application scenarios. They make
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Figure 1: Job seeker example to illustrate how small a differ-
ence in relevance can lead to a large difference in exposure
(an opportunity) for the group of females.
use of the concept of protected groups1, where fairness is related to
the differences in how groups are treated. However, we later discuss
how this extends to individual fairness by considering groups of size
one. The three examples illustrate how fairness can be related to a
biased allocation of opportunity, misrepresentation of real-world
distributions, and fairness as a freedom of speech principle.
Example 1: Fairly Allocating Economic Opportunity. Consider a
web-service that connects employers (users) to potential employees
(items). The following example demonstrates how small differences
in item relevance can cause a large difference in exposure and
therefore economic opportunity across groups. In this case, the web-
service uses a ranking-based system to present a set of 6 applicants
for a software engineering position to relevant employers (Figure 1).
The set contains 3 males and 3 females. The male applicants have
relevance of 0.80, 0.79, 0.78 respectively for the employers, while
the female applicants have relevance of 0.77, 0.76, 0.75 respectively.
Here we follow the standard probabilistic definition of relevance,
where 0.77 means that 77% of all employers issuing the query find
that applicant relevant. The Probability Ranking Principle suggests
ranking these applicants in the decreasing order of relevance i.e.
the 3 males at the top positions, followed by the females. What does
this mean for exposure between the two groups? If we consider
a standard exposure drop-off (i.e., position bias) of 1/log(1 + j),
where j is the position in the ranking, as commonly used in the
Discounted Cumulative Gain (DCG) measure, the female applicants
will get 30% less exposure – even though the average difference
in relevance between male and female applicants is just 0.03 (see
Figure 1). Is this winner-take-all allocation of exposure fair in this
context, even if the winner just has a tiny advantage in relevance?
2 It seems reasonable to distribute exposure more evenly, even if
this may mean a small drop in utility to the employers.
1Groups that are protected from discrimination by law, based on sex, race, age, disability,
color, creed, national origin, or religion. We use a broader meaning of protected groups
here that suits our domain.
2Note that this tiny advantage may come from 3% of the employers being gender
biased, but this is not a problem we are addressing here.
Figure 2: An image search result page for the query "CEO"
showing a disproportionate number of male CEOs.
Example 2: Fairly Representing a Distribution of Results. Some-
times the results of a query are used as a statistical sample – either
explicitly or implicitly. For example, a user may expect that an im-
age search for the query “CEO” on a search engine returns roughly
the right number of male and female executives, reflecting the true
distribution of male vs. female CEOs in the world. If a search engine
returns a highly disproportionate number of males as compared to
females like in the hypothetical results in Figure 2, then the search
engine may be perceived as biased. In fact, a study detected the
presence of gender bias in image search results for a variety of
occupations [5, 19]. A biased information environment may affect
users’ perceptions and behaviors, and it was shown that such biases
indeed affect people’s belief about various occupations [19]. Note
that the Probability Ranking Principle does not necessarily produce
results that represent the relevance distribution in an unbiased way.
This means that even if users’ relevance distribution agrees with
the true distribution of female CEOs, the optimal ranking accord-
ing to the Probability Ranking Principle may still look like that in
Figure 2. Instead of solely relying on the PRP, it seems reasonable
to distribute exposure proportional to relevance, even if this may
mean a drop in utility to the users.
Example 3: Giving Speakers Fair Access to Willing Listeners. Rank-
ing systems play an increasing role as a medium for speech, creating
a connection between bias and fairness in rankings and principles
behind freedom of speech [14]. While the ability to produce speech
and make this speech available on the internet has certainly created
new opportunities to exercise freedom of speech for a speaker, there
remains the question whether or not free speech makes its way to
the interested listeners. Hence the study of the medium becomes
necessary. Search engines are the most popular mediums of this
kind and therefore have an immense capability of influencing user
attention through their editorial policies, which has sparked a pol-
icy debate around search neutrality [13, 14, 16]. While no unified
definition of search neutrality exists, many argue that search en-
gines should have no editorial policies other than that their results
are comprehensive, impartial, and solely ranked by relevance [26].
But does ranking solely on relevance necessarily imply the Proba-
bility Ranking Principle, or are there other relevance-based ranking
principles that lead to a medium with a more equitable distribution
of exposure and access to willing listeners?
2 RELATEDWORK
Before introducing the algorithmic framework for formulating a
broad range of fairness constraints on rankings, we first survey
three related strands of prior work. First, this paper draws on con-
cepts for algorithmic fairness of supervised learning in the presence
of sensitive attributes. Second, we relate to prior work on algorith-
mic fairness for rankings. Finally, we contrast fairness with the
well-studied area of diversified ranking in information retrieval.
2.1 Algorithmic Fairness
As algorithmic techniques, especially machine learning, find wide-
spread applications, there is much interest in understanding its
societal impacts. While algorithmic decisions can counteract ex-
isting biases, algorithmic and data-driven decision making affords
new mechanisms for introducing unintended bias [2]. There have
been numerous attempts to define notions of fairness in the super-
vised learning setting. The individual fairness perspective states
that two individuals similar with respect to a task should be clas-
sified similarly [12]. Individual fairness is hard to define precisely
because of the lack of agreement on task-specific similarity metrics
for individuals. There is also a group fairness perspective for super-
vised learning that implies constraints like demographic parity and
equalized odds. Demographic parity posits that decisions should
be balanced around a sensitive attribute like gender or race [6, 38].
However, it has been shown that demographic parity causes a loss
in the utility and infringes individual fairness [12], since even a
perfect predictor typically does not achieve demographic parity.
Equalized odds represents the equal opportunity principle for super-
vised learning and defines the constraint that the false positive and
true positive rates should be equal for different protected groups
[15]. Several recent works have focused on learning algorithms
compatible with these definitions of fair classification [32, 34, 36],
including causal approaches to fairness [20, 21, 23]. In this paper,
we draw on many of the concepts introduced in the context of fair
supervised learning but do not consider the problem of learning.
Instead, we ask how to fairly allocate exposure in rankings based on
relevance, independent of how these relevances may be estimated.
2.2 Fairness in Rankings
Several recent works have raised the question of group fairness
in rankings. Yang and Stoyanovich [33] propose statistical parity
based measures that compute the difference in the distribution
of different groups for different prefixes of the ranking (top-10,
top-20 and so on). The differences are then averaged for these
prefixes using a discounted weighting (like in DCG). This measure
is then used as a regularization term. Zehlike et al. [35] formulate
the problem of finding a ‘Fair Top-k ranking’ that optimizes utility
while satisfying two sets of constraints: first, in-group monotonicity
for utility (i.e. more relevant items above less relevant within the
group), second, a fairness constraint that the proportion of protected
group items in every prefix of the top-k ranking is above a minimum
threshold. Celis et al. [8] propose a constrained maximum weight
matching algorithm for ranking a set of items efficiently under a
fairness constraint indicating the maximum number of items with
each sensitive attribute allowed in the top positions. Some recent
approaches, like Asudeh et al. [1], have also looked at the task
of designing fair scoring functions that satisfy desirable fairness
constraints.
Most of the fairness constraints defined in the previous work
reflect parity constraints restricting the fraction of items with each
attribute in the ranking [31]. The framework we propose goes
beyond such parity constraints, as we propose a general algorithmic
framework for efficiently computing optimal probabilistic rankings
for a large class of possible fairness constraints.
Concurrent and independent work by Biega et al. [3] formulates
fairness for rankings similar to the special case of our framework
discussed in Section § 4.2, aiming to achieve amortized fairness
of attention by making exposure proportional to relevance. They
focus on individual fairness, which in our framework amounts to
the special case of protected groups of size one. The two approaches
not only differ in expressive power, but algorithmically, they solve
an integer linear program to generate a series of rankings, while
our approach provides a provably efficient solution via a standard
linear program and the Birkhoff-von Neumann decomposition [4].
2.3 Information Diversity in Retrieval
At first glance, fairness and diversity in rankings may appear re-
lated, since they both lead to more diverse rankings. However, their
motivation and mechanisms are fundamentally different. Like the
PRP, diversified ranking is entirely beholden to maximizing utility
to the user, while our approach to fairness balances the needs of
users and items. In particular, both the PRP and diversified ranking
maximize utility for the user alone, their difference lies merely in
the utility measure that is maximized. Under extrinsic diversity
[24], the utility measure accounts for uncertainty and diminishing
returns from multiple relevant results [7, 25]. Under intrinsic di-
versity [24], the utility measure considers rankings as portfolios
and reflects redundancy [10]. And under exploration diversity [24],
the aim is to maximize utility to the user in the long term through
more effective learning. The work on fairness in this paper is fun-
damentally different in its motivation and mechanism, as it does
not modify the utility measure for the user but instead introduces
rights of the items that are being ranked.
3 A FRAMEWORK FOR RANKING UNDER
FAIRNESS CONSTRAINTS
Acknowledging the ubiquity of rankings across applications, we
conjecture that there is no single definition of what constitutes a
fair ranking, but that fairness depends on context and application.
In particular, we will see below that different notions of fairness
imply different trade-offs in utility, which may be acceptable in
one situation but not in the other. To address this range of pos-
sible fairness constraints, this section develops a framework for
formulating fairness constraints on rankings, and then computing
the utility-maximizing ranking subject to these fairness constraints
with provable guarantees.
For simplicity, consider a single query q and assume that we
want to present a ranking r of a set of documents D = {d1,d2,d3
. . . ,dN }. Denoting the utility of a ranking r for query q with U(r |q),
the problem of optimal ranking under fairness constraints can be
formulated as the following optimization problem:
r = argmaxr U(r |q)
s.t. r is fair
In this way, we generalize the goal of the Probabilistic Ranking
Principle, which emerges as the special case of no fairness con-
straints. To fully instantiate and solve this optimization problem,
we will specify the following four components. First, we define a
general class of utility measures U(r |q) that contains many com-
monly used ranking metrics. Second, we address the problem of
how to optimize over rankings, which are discrete combinatorial
objects, by extending the class of rankings to probabilistic rankings.
Third, we reformulate the optimization problem as an efficiently
solvable linear program, which implies a convenient yet expressive
language for formulating fairness constraints. And, finally, we show
how a probabilistic ranking can be efficiently recovered from the
solution of the linear program.
3.1 Utility of a Ranking
Virtually all utility measures used for ranking evaluation derive
the utility of the ranking from the relevance of the individual items
being ranked. For each user u and query q, rel(d |u,q) denotes the
binary relevance of the document d , i.e. whether the document
is relevant to user u or not. Note that different users can have
different rel(d |u,q) even if they share the same q. To account for
personalization, we assume that the query q also contains any
personalization features and thatU is the set of all users that lead
to identical q. Beyond binary relevance, rel could also represent
other relevance rating systems such as a Likert scale in movie
ratings, or a real-valued score.
A generic way to express many utility measures commonly used
in information retrieval is
U(r |q) =
∑
u ∈U
P(u |q)
∑
d ∈D
v(rank(d |r ))λ(rel(d |u,q)),
where v and λ are two application-dependent functions. The func-
tion v(rank(d |r )) models how much attention document d gets at
rank rank(d |r ), and λ is a function that maps the relevance of the
document for a user to its utility. In particular, the choice ofv could
be based on the position bias i.e. the fraction of users who examine
the document shown at a particular position out of the total number
of users who issue the queryq. The choice of λmapping relevance to
utility is somewhat arbitrary. For example, a widely used evaluation
measure, Discounted Cumulative Gain (DCG) [17] can be repre-
sented in our framework wherev(rank(d |r )) = 1log(1+rank(d |r )) , and
λ(rel(d |u,q)) = 2rel(d |u,q) − 1 (or sometimes simply rel(d |u,q)):
DCG(r |q) =
∑
u ∈U
P(u |q)
∑
d ∈D
2rel(d |u,q) − 1
loд(1 + rank(d |r ))
For a measure like DCG@k(r |q), we can choose v(rank(d |r )) =
1
log(1+rank(d |r )) for rank(d |r ) ≤ k andv(rank(d |r )) = 0 for rank(d |r ) >
k .
Since utility is linear in both v and λ, we can combine the indi-
vidual utilities into an expectation
U(r |q) =
∑
d ∈D
v(rank(d |r ))
( ∑
u ∈U
λ(rel(d |u,q)) P(u |q)
)
=
∑
d ∈D
v(rank(d |r ))u(d |q),
where
u(d |q) =
∑
u ∈U
λ(rel(d |u,q)) P(u |q)
is the expected utility of a document d for query q. In the case of
binary relevances and λ as the identity function,u(d |q) is equivalent
to the probability of relevance. It is easy to see that sorting the
documents by u(d |q) leads to the ranking that maximizes the utility
argmaxr U(r |q) ≡ argsortd ∈D u(d |q)
for any function v that decreases with rank. This is the insight
behind the Probability Ranking Principle (PRP) [28].
3.2 Probabilistic Rankings
Rankings are combinatorial objects, such that naively searching the
space of all rankings for a utility-maximizing ranking under fairness
constraints would take time that is exponential in |D|. To avoid
such combinatorial optimization, we consider probabilistic rankings
R instead of a single deterministic ranking r . A probabilistic ranking
R is a distribution over rankings, and we can naturally extend the
definition of utility to probabilistic rankings.
U(R |q) =
∑
r
R(r )
∑
u ∈U
P(u |q)
∑
d ∈D
v(rank(d |r ))λ(rel(d |u,q))
=
∑
r
R(r )
∑
d ∈D
v(rank(d |r )) u(d |q)
While distributions R over rankings are still exponential in size, we
can make use of the additional insight that utility can already be
computed from the marginal rank distributions of the documents.
Let Pi, j be the probability that R places document di at rank j , then
P forms a doubly stochastic matrix of size N × N , which means
that the sum of each row and each column of the matrix is equal
to 1. In other words, the sum of probabilities for each position is 1
and the sum of probabilities for each document is 1, i.e.
∑
i Pi, j = 1
and
∑
j Pi, j = 1. With knowledge of the doubly stochastic matrix
P, expected utility for a probabilistic ranking can be computed as
U(P|q) =
∑
di ∈D
N∑
j=1
Pi, j u(di |q)v(j). (1)
To make notation more concise, we can rewrite the utility of the
ranking as a matrix product. For this, we introduce two vectors: u
is a column vector of size N with ui = u(di |q) , and v is another
column vector of size N with vj = v(j). So, the expected utility (e.g.
DCG) can be written as:
U(P|q) = uT Pv (2)
3.3 Optimizing Fair Rankings via Linear
Programming
We will see in Section § 3.4 that not only does R imply a doubly
stochastic matrix P, but that we can also efficiently compute a
probabilistic rankingR for every doubly stochastic matrix P. We can,
therefore, formulate the problem of finding the utility-maximizing
probabilistic ranking under fairness constraints in terms of doubly
stochastic matrices instead of distributions over rankings.
P = argmaxP u
T Pv (expected utility)
s.t. 1T P = 1T (sum of probabilities for each position)
P1 = 1 (sum of probabilities for each document)
0 ≤ Pi, j ≤ 1 (valid probability)
P is fair (fairness constraints)
Note that the optimization objective is linear inN 2 variables Pi, j , 1 ≤
i, j ≤ N . Furthermore, the constraints ensuring that P is doubly
stochastic are linear as well, where 1 is the column vector of size N
containing all ones. Without the fairness constraint and for any vj
that decreases with j, the solution is the permutation matrix that
ranks the set of documents in decreasing order of utility (conform-
ing to the PRP).
Now that we have expressed the problem of finding the utility-
maximizing probabilistic ranking, besides the fairness constraint,
as a linear program, a convenient language to express fairness
constraints would be linear constraints of the form
fT Pg = h.
One or more of such constraints can be added, and the resulting
linear program can still be solved efficiently and optimally with
standard algorithms like interior point methods. As we will show
in Section § 4, the vectors f , g and the scalar h can be chosen to
implement a range of different fairness constraints. To give some
intuition, the vector f can be used to encode group identity and/or
relevance of each document, while g will typically reflect the im-
portance of each position (e.g. position bias).
3.4 Sampling Rankings
The solution P of the linear program is a matrix containing probabil-
ities of each document at each position. To implement this solution
in a ranking system, we need to compute a probabilistic ranking
R that corresponds to P. From this probabilistic ranking, we can
then sample rankings r ∼ R to present to the user3. Given the
derivation of our approach, it is immediately apparent that the
rankings r sampled from R fulfill the specified fairness constraints
in expectation.
Computing R from P can be achieved via the Birkhoff-von Neu-
mann (BvN) decomposition [4], which provides a transformation
to decompose a doubly stochastic matrix into a convex sum of per-
mutation matrices. In particular, if A is a doubly stochastic matrix,
there exists a decomposition of the form
A = θ1A1 + θ2A2 + · · · + θnAn
3For usability reasons, it is preferable to make this sampling pseudo-random based on
a hash of the user’s identity, so that the same user receives the same ranking r if the
same query is repeated.
where 0 ≤ θi ≤ 1, ∑i θi = 1, and where the Ai are permutation
matrices [4]. In our case, the permutation matrices correspond to
deterministic rankings of the document set and the coefficients
correspond to the probability of sampling each ranking. According
to the Marcus-Ree theorem, there exists a decomposition with no
more than (N − 1)2 + 1 permutation matrices [22]. Such a decompo-
sition can be computed efficiently in polynomial time using several
algorithms [9, 11]. For the experiments in this paper, we use the
implementation provided at https://github.com/jfinkels/birkhoff.
3.5 Summary of Algorithm
The following summarizes the algorithm for optimal ranking under
fairness constraints. Note that we have assumed knowledge of the
true relevances u(d |q) throughout this paper, whereas in practice
one would work with estimates uˆ(d |q) from some predictive model.
(1) Set up the utility vector u, the position discount vector v, as
well as the vectors f and g, and the scalar h for the fairness
constraints (see Section § 4).
(2) Solve the linear program from Section § 3.3 for P.
(3) Compute the Birkhoff-von Neumann decomposition P =
θ1P1 + θ2P2 + · · · + θnPn .
(4) Sample permutation matrix Pi with probability proportional
to θi and display the corresponding ranking ri .
Note that the rankings sampled in the last step of the algorithm
fulfill the fairness constraints in expectation, while at the same time
they maximize expected utility.
4 CONSTRUCTING GROUP FAIRNESS
CONSTRAINTS
Now that we have established a framework for formulating fairness
constraints and optimally solving the associated ranking problem,
we still need to understand the expressiveness of constraints of the
form fT Pg = h. In this section, we explore how three concepts from
algorithmic fairness – demographic parity, disparate treatment,
and disparate impact – can be implemented in our framework and
thus be enforced efficiently and with provable guarantees. They all
aim to fairly allocate exposure, which we now define formally. Let
vj represent the importance of position j, or more concretely the
position bias at j, which is the fraction of users that examine the
item at this position. Then we define exposure for a document di
under a probabilistic ranking P as
Exposure(di |P) =
N∑
j=1
Pi, jvj (3)
The goal is to allocate exposure fairly between groups Gk . Doc-
uments and items may belong to different groups because of some
sensitive attributes – for example, news stories belong to different
sources, products belong to different manufacturers, applicants be-
long to different genders. The fairness constraints we will formulate
in the following implement different goals for allocating exposure
between groups.
To illustrate the effect of the fairness constraints, we will provide
empirical results on two ranking problems. For both, we use the
average relevance of each document (normalized between 0 and 1)
as the utility ui = u(di |q) and set the position bias to vj = 1log(1+j)
just like in the standard definition of DCG. More generally, one can
also plug in the actual position-bias value, which can be estimated
through an intervention experiment [18].
Job-seeker example. We come back to the job-seeker example
from the introduction, and as illustrated in Figure 1. The ranking
problem consists of 6 applicants with probabilities of relevance to
an employer of u = (0.81, 0.80, 0.79, 0.78, 0.77, 0.76)T . Groups G0
and G1 reflect gender, with the first three applicants belonging to
the male group and the last three to the female group.
News recommendation dataset. We use a subset the Yow news
recommendation dataset [37] to analyze our method on a larger
and real-world relevance distribution. The dataset contains explicit
and implicit feedback from a set of users for news articles from
different RSS feeds. We randomly sample a subset of news articles
in the “people” topic coming from the top two sources. The sources
are identified using RSS Feed identifier and used as groups G0 and
G1. The ‘relevant’ field is used as the measure of relevance for our
task. Since the relevance is given as a rating from 1 to 5, we divide
it by 5 and add a small amount of Gaussian noise (ϵ = 0.05) to break
ties. The resulting ui are clipped to lie between 0 and 1.
In the following, we formulate fairness constraints using three
ideas for allocation of exposure to different groups. In particular, we
will define constraints of the form fT Pg = h for the optimization
problem in § 3.3. For simplicity, we will only present the case of a
binary valued sensitive attribute i.e. two groups G0 and G1. How-
ever, these constraints may be defined for each pair of groups and
for each sensitive attribute, and be included in the linear program.
4.1 Demographic Parity Constraints
Arguably the simplest way of defining fairness of exposure between
groups is to enforce that the average exposure of the documents
in both the groups is equal. Denoting average exposure in a group
with
Exposure(Gk |P) =
1
|Gk |
∑
di ∈Gk
Exposure(di |P),
this can be expressed as the following constraint in our framework:
Exposure(G0 |P) = Exposure(G1 |P) (4)
⇔ 1|G0 |
∑
di ∈G0
N∑
j=1
Pi, jvj =
1
|G1 |
∑
di ∈G1
N∑
j=1
Pi, jvj (5)
⇔
∑
di ∈D
N∑
j=1
(
1di ∈G0
|G0 | −
1di ∈G1
|G1 |
)
Pi, jvj = 0 (6)
⇔ fT Pv = 0 (with fi = 1di ∈G0|G0 | −
1di ∈G1
|G1 | )
In the last step, we obtain a constraint in the form fT Pg = h which
one can plug it into the linear program from Section § 3.3. We
call this a Demographic Parity Constraint similar to an analogous
constraint in fair supervised learning [6, 38]. Similar to that setting,
in our case also, such a constraint may lead to a big loss in utility in
cases when the two groups are very different in terms of relevance
distribution.
Experiments. We solved the linear program in § 3.3 twice –
once without and once with the demographic parity constraint
from above. For the job seeker example, Figure 3 shows the optimal
rankings in terms of Pwithout andwith fairness constraint in panels
(a) and (b) respectively. Color indicates the probability value.
Note that the fair ranking according to demographic parity in-
cludes a substantial amount of stochasticity. However, panels (c)
and (d) show that the fair ranking can be decomposed into a mix-
ture of two deterministic permutation matrices with the associated
weights.
Compared to the DCG of the unfair ranking with 3.8193, the
optimal fair ranking has slightly lower utility with a DCG of 3.8031.
However, the drop in utility due to the demographic parity con-
straint could be substantially larger. For example, if we lowered the
relevances for the female group to u = (0.82, 0.81, 0.80, 0.03, 0.02,
0.01)T , we would still get the same fair ranking as the current so-
lution, since this fairness constraint is ignorant of relevance. In
this ranking, roughly every second document has low relevance,
leading to a large drop in DCG. It is interesting to point out that
the effect of demographic parity in ranking is therefore analogous
to its effect in supervised learning, where it can also lead to a large
drop in classification accuracy [12].
We also conducted the same experiment on the news recom-
mendation dataset. Figure 4 shows the optimal ranking matrix and
the fair probabilistic ranking along with DCG for each. Note that
even though the optimal unfair ranking places documents from G1
starting at position 5, the constraint pushes the ranking of the news
items from G1 further up the ranking starting either at rank 1 or
rank 2. In this case, the optimal fair ranking happens to be (almost)
deterministic except at the beginning.
4.2 Disparate Treatment Constraints
Unlike demographic parity, the constraints we explore in this and
the following section depend on the relevance of the items being
ranked. In this way, these constraints have the potential to address
the concerns for the job-seeker example from the introduction,
where a small difference in relevance was magnified into a large
difference in exposure. Furthermore, we saw that in the image-
search example from the introduction that it may be desirable to
have exposure be proportional to relevance to achieve some form
of unbiased statistical representation. Denoting the average utility
of a group with
U(Gk |q) =
1
|Gk |
∑
di ∈Gk
ui ,
this motivates the following type of constraint, which enforces that
exposure of the two groups to be proportional to their average
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Figure 3: Job seeker example with demographic parity constraint. (a) Optimal unfair ranking thatmaximizes DCG. (b) Optimal
fair ranking under demographic parity. (c) and (d) are the BvN decomposition of the fair ranking.
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Figure 4: News recommendation dataset with demographic
parity constraint. G0: Document id. 0-14, G1: 15-24 (a) Opti-
mal unfair ranking that maximizes DCG. (b) Optimal fair
ranking under demographic parity.
utility.
Exposure(G0 |P)
U(G0 |q) =
Exposure(G1 |P)
U(G1 |q)
⇔
1
|G0 |
∑
di ∈G0
∑N
j=1 Pi, jvj
U(G0 |q) =
1
|G1 |
∑
di ∈G1
∑N
j=1 Pi, jvj
U(G1 |q) (7)
⇔
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(
1di ∈G0
|G0 |U(G0 |q) −
1di ∈G1
|G1 |U(G1 |q)
)
Pi, jvj = 0 (8)
⇔ fT Pv = 0 (with fi =
(
1di ∈G0
|G0 |U(G0 |q) −
1di ∈G1
|G1 |U(G1 |q)
)
)
We name this constraint a Disparate Treatment Constraint be-
cause allocating exposure to a group is analogous to treating the
two groups of documents. This is motivated in principle by the con-
cept of Recommendations as Treatments [29], where recommending
or exposing a document is considered as treatment and the user’s
click or purchase is considered the effect of the treatment.
To quantify treatment disparity, we also define a measure called
Disparate Treatment Ratio (DTR) to evaluate how unfair a ranking
is in this respect i.e. how differently the two groups are treated.
DTR(G0,G1 |P,q) = Exposure(G0 |P)/U(G0 |q)Exposure(G1 |P)/U(G1 |q)
Note that this ratio equals one if the disparate treatment constraint
in Equation 7 is fulfilled. Whether the value is less than 1 or greater
than 1 tells which group out ofG0 or G1 is disadvantaged in terms
of disparate treatment.
Experiments. We again compute the optimal ranking without
fairness constraint, and with the disparate treatment constraint.
The results for the job-seeker example are shown in Figure 5. The
figure also shows the BvN decomposition of the resultant proba-
bilistic ranking into three permutation matrices. As expected, the
fair ranking has an optimal DTR while the unfair ranking has a
DTR of 1.7483. Also expected is that the fair ranking has a lower
DCG than the optimal deterministic ranking, but that it has higher
DCG than the optimal fair ranking under demographic parity.
We conducted the same experiment for the news recommenda-
tion dataset. Figure 6 shows the optimal ranking matrix and the fair
probabilistic ranking along with DCG for each. Here, the ranking
computed without the fairness constraint happened to be almost
fair according to disparate treatment already, and the fairness con-
straint has very little impact on DCG.
4.3 Disparate Impact Constraints
In the previous section, we constrained the exposures (treatments)
for the two groups to be proportional to their average utility. How-
ever, we may want to go a step further and define a constraint
on the impact, i.e. the expected clickthrough or purchase rate, as
this more directly reflects the economic impact of the ranking. In
particular, we may want to assure that the clickthrough rates for
the groups as determined by the exposure and relevance are pro-
portional to their average utility. To formally define this, let us first
model the probability of a document getting clicked according to
the following simple click model [27]:
P(click on document i) = P(examining i) × P(i is relevant)
= Exposure(di |P) × P(i is relevant)
=
( N∑
j=1
Pi, jvj
)
× ui
We can now compute the average clickthrough rate of documents
in a group Gk as
CTR(Gk |P) =
1
|Gk |
∑
i ∈Gk
N∑
j=1
Pi, juivj .
The following Disparate Impact Constraint enforces that the ex-
pected clickthrough rate of each group is proportional to its average
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Figure 5: Job seeker example with disparate treatment constraint. (a) Optimal unfair ranking. (b) Fair ranking under disparate
treatment constraint. (c), (d), (e) are the BvN decomposition of the fair ranking.
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Figure 6: News recommendation datasetwith disparate treat-
ment constraint. (a) Optimal unfair ranking. (b) Fair ranking
under disparate treatment constraint.
utility:
CTR(G0 |P)
U(G0 |q) =
CTR(G1 |P)
U(G1 |q) (9)
⇔
1
|G0 |
∑
i ∈G0
∑N
j=1 Pi, juivj
U(G0 |q) =
1
|G1 |
∑
i ∈G1
∑N
j=1 Pi, juivj
U(G1 |q) (10)
⇔
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(
1di ∈G0
|G0 |U(G0 |q) −
1di ∈G1
|G1 |U(G1 |q)
)
uiPi, jvj = 0 (11)
⇔ fT Pv = 0 (with fi =
(
1di ∈G0
|G0 |U(G0 |q) −
1di ∈G1
|G1 |U(G1 |q)
)
ui )
Similar to DTR, we can define the following Disparate Impact
Ratio (DIR) to measure the extent to which the disparate impact
constraint is violated:
DIR(G0,G1 |P,q) = CTR(G0 |P)/U(G0 |q)CTR(G1 |P)/U(G1 |q)
Note that this ratio equals one if the disparate impact constraint in
Equation 11 is fulfilled. Similar to DTR, whether DIR is less than
1 or greater than 1 tells which group is disadvantaged in terms of
disparate impact.
Experiments. We again compare the optimal rankings with and
without the fairness constraint. The results for the job-seeker ex-
ample are shown in Figure 7. Again, the optimal fair ranking has a
BvN decomposition into three deterministic rankings, and it has
a slightly reduced DCG. However, there is a large improvement
in DIR from the fairness constraint, since the PRP ranking has a
substantial disparate impact on the two groups.
The results for the news recommendation dataset are given in
Figure 8, where we also see a large improvement in DIR. The DCG
is lower than the unconstrained DCG and the DCG with disparate
treatment constraint, but higher than the DCG with demographic
parity constraint.
5 DISCUSSION
In the last section, we implemented three fairness constraints in
our framework, motivated by the concepts of demographic parity,
disparate treatment, and disparate impact. The main purpose was
to explore the expressiveness of the framework, and we do not
argue that these constraints are the only conceivable ones or the
correct ones for a given application. In particular, it appears that
fairness in rankings is inherently a trade-off between the utility
of the users and the rights of the items that are being ranked, and
that different applications require making this trade-off in different
ways. For example, we may not want to convey strong rights to the
books in a library when a user is trying to locate a book, but the
situation is different when candidates are being ranked for a job
opening. We, therefore, focused on creating a flexible framework
that covers a substantial range of fairness constraints.
Group fairness vs. individual fairness. In our experiments,
we observe that even though the constraints ensure that the rank-
ings have no disparate treatment or disparate impact across groups,
individual items within a group might still be considered to suffer
from disparate treatment or impact. For example, in the job-seeker
experiment for disparate treatment (Figure 5), the allocation of
exposure to the candidates within group G0 still follows the same
exposure drop-off going down the ranking that we considered un-
fair according to the disparate treatment constraint. As a remedy,
one could include additional fairness constraints for other sensitive
attributes, like race, disability, and national origin to further refine
the desired notion of fairness. In the extreme, our framework allows
protected groups of size one, such that it can also express notions of
individual fairness. For example, in the case of Disparate Treatment,
we could express individual fairness as a set of N − 1 constraints
over N groups of size one, resulting in a notion of fairness similar
to [3]. However, for the Disparate Impact constraint where the
expected clickthrough rates are proportional to the relevances, it is
not clear whether individual fairness makes sense, unless we rank
items uniformly at random.
Using estimated utilities. In our definitions and experiments,
we assumed that we have access to the true expected utilities (i.e.
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Figure 7: Job seeker example with disparate impact constraint. (a) Optimal unfair ranking. (b) Fair ranking under disparate
impact constraint. (c), (d), (e) are the BvN decomposition of the fair ranking.
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Figure 8: News recommendation dataset with disparate im-
pact constraint. (a) Optimal unfair ranking. (b) Fair ranking
under disparate impact constraint.
relevances)u(d |q). In practice, these utilities are typically estimated
via machine learning. This learning step is subject to other biases
that may, in turn, lead to biased estimates uˆ(d |q). Most importantly,
biased estimates may be the result of selection biases in click data,
but recent counterfactual learning techniques [18] have been shown
to permit unbiased learning-to-rank despite biased click data.
Cost of fairness. Including the fairness constraints in the opti-
mization problem comes at the cost of effectiveness as measured
by DCG and other conventional measures. This loss in utility can
be computed as CoF = uT (P∗ − P)v, where P∗ is the deterministic
optimal ranking, and P represents the fair ranking. We have already
discussed for the demographic parity constraint that this cost can
be substantial. In particular, for demographic parity it is easy to
see that the utility of the fair ranking approaches zero if all rele-
vant documents are in one group, and the size of the other group
approaches infinity.
Feasibility of fair solutions. The linear program from Sec-
tion § 3.3 may not have a solution in extreme conditions, corre-
sponding to cases where no fair solution exists. Consider the dis-
parate treatment constraint
Exposure(G0 |P)
Exposure(G1 |P) =
U(G0 |q)
U(G1 |q) .
We can adversarially construct an infeasible constraint by choosing
the relevance so that the ratio on the RHS lies outside the range that
LHS can achieve by varying P. The maximum of the RHS occurs
when all the documents of G0 are placed above all the documents
of G1, and vice versa for the minimum.
max
{
Exposure(G0 |P)
Exposure(G1 |P)
}
=
∑ |G0 |
j=1 vj∑ |G0 |+ |G1 |
j= |G0 |+1 vj
,
(all G0 documents in top |G0 | positions)
min
{
Exposure(G0 |P)
Exposure(G1 |P)
}
=
∑ |G1 |+ |G0 |
j= |G1 |+1 vj∑ |G1 |
j=1 vj
(all G0 documents in bottom |G0 | positions)
Hence, a fair ranking according to disparate treatment only exists if
the ratio of average utilities lies within the range of possible values
for the exposure:∑ |G1 |+ |G0 |
j= |G1 |+1 vj∑ |G1 |
j=1 vj
≤ U(G0 |q)U(G1 |q) ≤
∑ |G0 |
j=1 vj∑ |G0 |+ |G1 |
j= |G0 |+1 vj
However, in such a scenario, the constraint can still be satisfied if
we introduce more documents belonging to neither group (or the
group with more relevant documents). This increases the range of
the LHS, and the ranking doesn’t have to give undue exposure to
one of the groups.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we considered fairness of rankings through the lens
of exposure allocation between groups. Instead of defining a single
notion of fairness, we developed a general framework that em-
ploys probabilistic rankings and linear programming to compute
the utility-maximizing ranking under a whole class of fairness con-
straints. To verify the expressiveness of this class, we showed how
to express fairness constraints motivated by the concepts of de-
mographic parity, disparate treatment, and disparate impact. We
conjecture that the appropriate definition of fair exposure depends
on the application, which makes this expressiveness desirable.
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